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MONOTONICITY IN 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH 
JEFFREY BANKS 
University of Rochester 
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral 
rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legis-
latures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral 
rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, 
that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in 
the context of a complete electoral system-voting, selection of legislature, and legis-
lative choice of policy-we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: 
depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either every-
thing is monotonic or nothing is monotonic. 
Broadly defined, a representative 
electoral system is a decentralized method 
for translating the preferences or interests 
of an electorate into policies via the selec-
tion of agents to a legislature. We can 
think of this process as the culmination of 
three distinct stages: (1) individuals make 
voting decisions based in some manner on 
their preferences; (2) the electoral rule in 
place determines who is elected to the 
legislature; and (3) the members of the 
legislature interact to derive a policy out-
come. While outcomes from the second 
stage are determined mechanically, those 
from the first and third stages depend 
inter alia on strategic decisions of voters, 
candidates, and elected officials. 
We have previously _developed two 
alternative models of the legislative stage 
3 and, in one case, examined the implica-
tions of the model for behavior at stage 1 
(Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, 1988). 
Now, however, we suppress issues con-
cerning behavior at the legislative stage 
and instead focus on stages 1 and 2, that 
is, on methods for translating votes into 
legislatures and the associated behavior of 
the voters. 
Much of the literature concerning the 
relative merits of alternative electoral 
rules is centered around the extent to 
which particular systems select "repre-
sentative" legislatures. And an important 
concern in evaluating the representative-
ness of an electoral rule is whether or not 
the rule is monotonic. Monotonicity is a 
criterion capturing the idea that social 
choices should reflect positively changes 
in individuals' preferences: "It would be 
perverse in the extreme if increased votes 
for an alternative contributed to its 
defeat. Consequently, it seems an elemen-
tary requirement of sensible and fair 
choice that the decision rule respond posi-
tively, or at least non-negatively, to 
increase in individual evaluation of an 
alternative" (Riker 1982, 45). It is often 
argued, however, that many rules-in 
particular, "elimination" rules such as 
single transferable vote (STV) or runoff 
-violate monotonicity and thus are 
essentially undesirable (e.g., Brams and 
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Fishburn 1984; Doron and Kronick 1977; 
Fishburn 1982; Riker 1982). 
However, we argue that such a conclu-
sion is unwarranted for two reasons. 
First, it is not the relationship between 
votes and legislatures that is of fundamen-
tal interest but rather the relationship 
between the underlying voter preferences 
and legislatures. The degree to which an 
electoral system is representative should 
not be judged with respect to voting deci-
sions (i.e., processes) but rather with 
respect to actual preferences over out-
comes (i.e., consequences). Analyzing 
this relationship between preferences and 
outcomes evidently requires a model of 
how voting behavior itself responds to 
changes in voters' preferences. Rather 
than specifying any particular model, 
however, we proceed by simply assuming 
the existence of some behavioral model of 
voting. We then show that if this model 
generates a unique prediction of how indi-
viduals vote for all possible profiles of 
underlying voter preferences, then for vir-
tually all electoral rules the translation of 
voter preferences into legislatures via the 
behavioral model and the electoral rule 
will be nonmonotonic. For example, since 
"sincere" voting under most electoral 
rules gives a unique behavioral predic-
tion, the resulting process will generate a 
nonmonotonic relationship between voter 
preferences and legislatures. On the other 
hand, the converse result holds if one 
admits behavioral predictions that are not 
necessarily unique for all profiles of 
underlying preferences. In particular, if 
one assumes the voters adopt Nash equi-
librium strategies, then for any electoral 
rule the resulting translation of prefer-
ences into legislatures will be monotonic. 
The second reason is that even if one 
has an intrinsic interest in process-
oriented monotonicity, it turns out that 
such a requirement is not satisfied by any 
reasonable electoral rule. As remarked 
earlier, the literature contains several 
examples to illustrate the process-oriented 
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nonmonotonicity of particular electoral 
rules such as STV and runoff. This result 
implies that such examples can be con-
structed for virtually all electoral rules. 
Thus, our main conclusion is that mono-
tonicity /nonmonotonicity in electoral 
systems is a nonissue. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that 
although to our knowledge our arguments 
are novel, they are predicated on known 
results in the social choice literature con-
cerning the existence of strategy-proof 
voting mechanisms. 1 
The Model 
Consider a political environment con-
sisting of a set N = {l, ... , n} voters, in a 
single district (the extension to multiple 
districts is straightforward). In a legisla-
tive election, the voters elect i representa-
tives to the legislature. Let K denote the 
set of candidates competing for the dis-
trict' s seats; candidates may or may not 
be affiliated through some party struc-
ture. Thus L = {A CK: I A I = £}is the set 
of all possible legislatures selected by the 
voters. 
Voters determine a legislature through 
an electoral mechanism (V, -y), where V 
= x vi and vi is voter i's strategy set, 
N 
and 'Y is a mapping 'Y : V - L; we refer to 
'Y as the electoral rule. Thus, given an 
electoral mechanism (V, -y) and a strategy 
profile v E V, the resultant legislature is 
given by -y( v) E L. Here we consider only 
the electoral rules for which the strategy 
sets of individuals {Vi) can be equated 
with the set of orderings Ri. Thus for all i, 
V; = Q(L), the set of orderings of L. 2 
Once the legislature L has been deter-
mined, elected representatives select a 
policy outcome from some arbitrary feasi-
ble outcome space, X. Since our principal 
focus here is on the effects of various elec-
toral laws, we suppress the behavioral 
model of the process by which legislatures 
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select outcomes by positing a reduced 
form expression u : L - X summarizing 
the outcome of legislative decision mak-
ing. Call u a legislative outcome function. 
So given a strategy profile v, voters deter-
mine policy outcomes in X through 
o(-y(v)). 
So far we have described the second 
and third stages of an electoral system. To 
complete the picture, it remains to de-
scribe how individuals select their voting 
strategies. Rather than restrict attention at 
the outset to one behavioral model, we 
define an abstract behavioral rule as a 
mapping that assigns to every possible 
profile of voter preferences a profile of 
decisions. Formally, let {j: Q(L)n -
Q(L)n denote an arbitrary behavioral cor-
respondence, where {j may be functional-
ly dependent on the electoral rule 'Y (e.g., 
the Nash equilibrium correspondence 
defined later). 
Finally, we assume voter i E N has 
well-defined basic preferences ~ ; on X. 
Given these basic preferences and given 
the legislative outcome function u, i has 
induced preferences R; over the set of 
legislatures L given by, V 'h,>: E L: AR;>: 
if and only if o('h) ~; o('h'). By definition, 
the structure of the domain of induced 
preferences over L depends on the struc-
ture of the domain of preferences over 
policy outcomes, X, and on the details of 
the legislative outcome function, u. In 
particular, unrestricted domain on X does 
not necessarily imply unrestricted domain 
on L. Without specifying u, however, 
nothing can be said about the structure of 
the domain of induced preferences. Given 
our focus, therefore, we make the con-
servative presumption that the domain of 
induced preferences over L is the un-
restricted set of either weak or strong 
orderings, denoted Q(L) and Q*(L), re-
spectively. In what follows, we take the 
domain to consist of weak orders unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. 
In sum, the formal representation of 
stages 1, 2, and 3 of an electoral system is 
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given by a specification of the triple 
((j, -y, u). The composition of these maps, 
{jo-you, thus characterizes the translation 
of voter preferences into policy outcomes 
through the electoral system. 
As noted in the introduction, our prin-
cipal aim is to establish results concerning 
monotonicity in electoral systems. To 
simplify the following arguments we dis-
tinguish two cases: single-member district 
(£ = 1) and multimember district(£> 1). 
Consider these in turn. 
Monotonicity in 
Single-Member Districts 
By assumption, t = 1 so that L = K, 
and V; is simply the set of orderings of 
candidates, K, competing for election. 
Thus, we can interpret a strategy by i, v;, 
as a ranking of K; so the statement 
"xv; y" means that xis ranked ahead of y 
according to i's strategy v;. 
DEFINITION 1. Let a : Q(L)n - L be an 
arbitrary function from voter pref-
erences into legislatures. We say that a 
is monotonic if x = a(v) and v' is such 
that xv; y implies xvi y, for all i E N 
and for ally E L, then x = a(v'). 
Suppose we apply this definition to an 
electoral rule 'Y. Then monotonicity for 
single-member districts requires that if a 
candidate is elected under a strategy pro-
file v and if under a new strategy profile v' 
every individual ranks that candidate at 
least as high as under v, then the candi-
date should still be elected. Thus, mono-
tonic electoral rules respond positively to 
changes in an individual's stated rankings 
of candidates. This description corre-
sponds precisely to the notion of process-
oriented monotonicity alluded to in the 
introduction. 
Now consider the composition {jo-y; 
observe that if {j is single-valued, then, 
just as with an electoral rule 'Y per se, {jo-y 
is a mapping from preference profiles into 
This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Fri, 18 Mar 2016 21:04:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 85 
legislatures. Setting f3o'Y = a in definition 
1 yields the requirement that if a candi-
date is elected under a preference profile 
R, and if under a new preference profile R' 
every individual ranks that candidate at 
least as high as under R, then the candi-
date should still be elected. And this is 
exactly the notion of consequence-
oriented monotonicity. 
The first result, Saijo's Theorem, makes 
use of the concept that a function a: 
Q(L)n - Lis constant if for all R, R' E 
Q(L)n, a(R) = a(R'): 
THEOREM 1. If a: Q(L)n - Lis monotonic, 
then a is constant (Saijo 1987). 
Hence, the requirement of monotonicity 
in an electoral rule is simply too stringent; 
the only electoral rule that satisfies 
process-oriented monotonicity is a trivial 
rule that selects the same legislature 
regardless of the individuals' voting deci-
sions. Similarly, consequence-oriented 
monotonicity implies that the chosen 
legislature is never a function of the indi-
viduals' preferences if the behavioral rule 
{3(.) is single-valued. For example, if {3(.) is 
the identity function (i.e., voters behave 
"sincerely"), the translation of voter pref-
erences into legislatures will be non-
monotonic. 
An important feature supporting Saijo's 
Theorem is the possibility of individual 
indifference over alternatives in L. For 
some electoral systems, however, this 
may not be appropriate; individuals may 
have only strict preferences over the alter-
natives they confront. So suppose we 
restrict attention to the set of linear orders 
over L, Q*(L). Say that a function a: 
Q*(L)n - Lis dictatorial if there exists an 
i E N such that for all profiles P E 
Q*(L)n, a(P) Pi A for all A E L \ a(P). 
Also say that a satisfies citizen sovereign-
ty if for all A E L, there exists a profile P 
E Q*(L)n such that a(P) = A. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose IL I =::: 3. If a: 
Q*(L)n· - Lis monotonic and satisfies 
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citizen sovereignty, then a is dicta-
torial (Muller and Satterthwaite 1977). 
Thus, as with theorem 1, requiring either 
process-oriented or consequence-oriented 
monotonicity (with {3(.) single-valued) 
yields an essentially negative result. 
A key element to both the results above 
is that the mapping a is single-valued. By 
definition, an electoral rule 'Y is necessar-
ily single-valued; therefore, theorems 1 
and 2 together imply that no reasonable 
electoral rule (i.e., nondictatorial and 
nonconstant) can satisfy process-oriented 
monotonicity. Similarly, if the behavioral 
model {3 is single-valued, the same con-
clusion applies to consequence-oriented 
monotonicity. However, many behavioral 
models are not necessarily single-valued, 
ih which case the composite map {30-y tak-
ing preference profiles into legislatures 
will not be single-valued and the theorems 
do not apply. 3 Hereafter, we relax the 
assumption {3(.) is single-valued and focus 
on a particular multivalued behavioral 
model, the Nash equilibrium correspon-
dence. 
DEFINITION 2. A correspondenceµ: Q(L)n 
- - L is monotonic if x E µ(R) and R' is 
such that x Ri y implies x R; y, for all 
i E N and ally E L, then x E µ.(R'). 
Note that definition 1 above is a special 
case of definition 2 when µ. is single-
valued, that is, a function. 
DEFINITION 3. A strategy profile v* is a 
Nash equilibrium if and only if for all 
i E N and all vi E Vi, -y(v*) Ri -y(vi, 
(v;)keN\ Iii). 
Let P(R; -y) denote the set of Nash equilib-
rium strategies given the electoral rule 'Y 
and true voter preferences R = (Ri) N 
over L. 
In contrast to previous conclusions con-
cerning monotonicity, the next result 
shows that given the behavioral model 
/3(.), all electoral rules are monotonic 
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when considering the relationship be-
tween true preferences and the chosen 
legislatures. 
THEOREM 3. For all electoral rules -y, the 
correspondence (3(.; -y)o-y: Q(L)n -- L 
is monotonic. 
Proof. Fix R and 'Y and let >. E L be sup-
ported as an equilibrium outcome by the 
strategy profile, v*. Let R' satisfy the 
antecedent in the definition of a mono-
tonic correspondence; the claim is that v* 
is an equilibrium for R'. If not, there exists 
a vi, i E N, such that -£-y(v*) Ri 1(vi, 
(v Zh*i)]. But this implies -c,,(v*) Ri 
-y(vi, (vk)k*i)], a contradiction. QED 
Hence, the Nash equilibrium corre-
spondence generates consequence-
oriented monotonicity for all electoral 
rules. 
From theorem 3, it is immediate that 
results concerning the nonmonotonicity 
of STV and similar rules depend critically 
on the assumption that voters faithfully 
report their true preferences, independent 
of any strategic or other considerations. 
In particular, if 'Y is not monotonic, as is 
the case with nonconstant (theorem 1) or 
nondictatorial (theorem 2) electoral rules, 
then the following corollary shows that 
this assumption is inconsistent with opti-
mizing behavior on the part of the voters: 
COROLLARY 1. If (V, -y) is such that 'Y is 
not monotonic, then there exists a pref-
erence profile R = (R 1, ••• , Rn) such 
that vi = Ri, for all i is not a Nash 
equilibrium (Muller and Satterthwaite 
1977). 
Putting the results together yields our 
main conclusion for single-member dis-
tricts: given that constant and dictatorial 
electoral rules are deemed unreasonable, 
either no reasonable electoral rule is 
monotonic or, relative to~(.), all electoral 
rules are monotonic. 
535 
Monotonicity in 
Multimember Districts 
By definition of a multimember district, 
£ > 1. Consequently, although voters in 
N have well-defined induced preferences 
(Ri) N over L, such preferences are over 
sets of candidates of cardinality £ > 1 
rather than over individual candidates per 
se. Electoral rules such as STV, however, 
require voters to report rankings of indi-
vidual candidates. Hence, V; = Q(K) * 
Q(L). Examples of the nonmonotonicity 
of, for example, STV, for multimember 
districts (e.g., Doron and Kronick 1977) 
use a notion of monotonicity related to 
that of definition 2 above. Specifically, if 
v and v' are lists of orderings of candi-
dates in K and if they are such that for all 
voters i, xvi y implies xvi y, then the col-
lection of candidates chosen under v coin-
cides with that chosen under v'. 
There are two difficulties with inter-
preting nonmonotonicity results based on 
this notion. The first is related to the dis-
tinction between process-oriented and 
consequence-oriented monotonicity. The 
second difficulty is that even allowing for 
a process-oriented judgment, this notion 
of monotonicity is inappropriate. The 
reason is that in multimember districts 
electoral rules do not, by definition, select 
single candidates but, rather, groups of 
candidates. Therefore, the relevant do-
main for any criterion such as monotonic-
ity should be the set of individual pref-
erences over such groups; these are, after 
all, the objects of choice. The mere fact 
that one candidate has risen in some indi-
vidual's ranking does not necessarily tell 
us anything about changes in that indi-
vidual's rankings over the relevant groups 
of candidates, that is, over L. Indeed, 
given our model, it is evident that voters 
do not even have well-defined preferences 
over candidates when district magnitude 
exceeds one. Basic preferences are over 
outcomes, X; and these induce preferences 
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over multimember legislatures in L via the 
legislative outcome function, u. 
To illustrate the last point, suppose the 
district magnitude is 2 (i = 2), and sup-
pose voter i ranks candidate a above can-
didate b. What does this imply about 
voter i's preferences over electoral out-
comes, given that the district elects not 
one candidate but two7 We would claim 
that any implication consistent with this 
requires a restriction on voter i's pref-
erences over pairs of candidates; specif-
ically, for any other candidate c, the pair 
of candidates (a, c) is preferred to the pair 
(b, c). 
In some circumstances the preceding 
restriction may be legitimate; yet it is a 
substantive restriction on individuals' 
preferences over electoral outcomes at the 
district level. For instance, in the double-
member district example, let K = 
{a, b, c, d} so that L = {(a, b), (a, c), 
(a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d)}. Suppose the 
four candidates {a, b, c, d} are associated 
with the points {118, 4/8, 5/8, 1} respec-
tively in the one-dimensional policy space 
X = [0, 1] and suppose voter i has sym-
metric single-peaked preferences ;::::: i on X 
with ideal point 1/2. Finally, suppose the 
legislative outcome function is u(x, y) = 
[x + y ]12, for all elected legislatures, 
(x, y) E L. Thus, at the legislative stage, 
the final policy outcome is the compro-
mise given by the midpoint of the elected 
candidates' positions. Then it is easy to 
check that the voter has induced pref-
erences Ri over L such that (a, d) is strictly 
preferred to (b, d), and (b, c) is strictly 
preferred to (a, c). But this violates the 
necessary restriction on preferences over 
K; the first ranking can only be rational-
ized at the individual candidate level by 
saying "i prefers a to b," while the second 
ranking can only be rationalized by say-
ing the converse. Thus, voter i is incapa-
ble of providing a ranking of individual 
candidates that reflects i's preferences 
over electoral outcomes (i.e., pairs of 
candidates). 
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Notice that there exists a "natural" 
ordering of the candidates for voter i, 
given by their policy positions in X; that is 
to say, b > i c > i a > 1 d. Were the district 
magnitude equal to one, this ordering 
would certainly constitute i's preferences 
over L. However, it is immaterial, given 
that the magnitude is two. 
To avoid the difficulty with STV-or 
indeed with any multimember electoral . 
rule where the strategy sets are ranking of 
individual candidates-one can simply 
require voters to report rankings of 
£-tuples of candidates (i.e., rankings of L). 
But then all electoral rules are observa-
tionally equivalent to single-member elec-
toral rules, where now "a member" is an 
element of L. 
Given that this modification is imple-
mented, theorems 1 and 2 apply: any rea-
sonable electoral rule fails the process-
oriented notion of monotonicity. Addi-
tionally, such rules fail consequence-
oriented monotonicity when the behav-
ioral rule P is single-valued. However, 
given {j (i.e., the Nash equilibrium corre-
spondence), the set of equilibrium out-
comes will always respond positively to 
changes in voter preferences regardless of 
the electoral rule. 
Conclusion 
We have foc;:used on the criteria of 
monotonicity and argued that as a norma-
tive critique the nonmonotonicity of elec-
toral rules and systems has no bite. In 
particular, in any reasonable electoral 
system, outcomes will always respond 
positively to changes in voter preferences 
(given the Nash behavioral hypothesis) 
while not necessarily responding posi-
tively to changes in voters' reported 
preferences. 
Finally, we emphasize that attempting 
to evaluate electoral systems by focusing 
exclusively on the electoral stages (stages 
1 and 2) at the expense of the legislative 
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stage (stage 3) is clearly inappropriate. 
Individuals have preferences over policy 
outcomes, and these induce preferences 
over the objects of choice (candidates or 
sets of candidates) through the legislative 
outcome function. The optimal voting 
decision for an individual in any election 
is therefore one that best promotes that 
individual's most preferred final outcome. 
Consequently, while an electoral rule may 
fail to satisfy a variety of appealing cri-
teria with respect to recorded voting deci-
sions, there is no reason to suppose the 
electoral system as a whole is not repre-
sentative of individuals' policy prefer-
ences. Only through explicit considera-
tion of all three stages can we have any 
confidence in judgments about any given 
electoral system's efficacy. 
Notes 
The first version of this paper was prepared for 
presentation at the Conference on Electoral Laws, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1990. We 
thank participants at the conference, in particular 
David Brady and Thomas Palfrey, for useful com-
ments. National Science Foundation financial sup-
port is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. This is in contrast to the literature on the exis-
tence of transitive, or acyclic, social choice rules. 
2. Although most commonly employed electoral 
mechanisms do not require voters to report complete 
orderings, they can be modeled as if they do. For 
instance, plurality voting (with strict orderings) 
would simply ignore everything but the top-ranked 
alternative. Similarly, approval voting (with weak 
orderings) would assign a value of one to every 
alternative in the top-ranked set and zero to all 
remaining alternatives. 
3. It is important to note that if {3(.) is set-valued, 
this does not imply that more than one candidate 
is elected to the legislature. Rather if v, v' E {3(.), 
this says that for some strategy profile v, "((v) is 
selected, that for a distinct profile v', ')'( v') is 
selected, and that both v and v' are consistent with 
the behavioral rule {3( .). 
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